

**DIRECT TESTIMONY**

of

**KAREN K. FURBISH**

**On Behalf of**

**WORLDCOM, INC.**

**Docket No. 01-0539**

**Submitted: June 11, 2002**

**OFFICIAL FILE**

J.C.C. DOCKET NO. 01-0539  
WorldCom Exhibit No. 1.0  
Witness Furbish  
Date 7/23/02 Reporter CHS



1       **Q.     PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, ADDRESS AND POSITION.**

2  
3       A.       My name is Karen Furbish. I am Principal Analyst – Access Services, for  
4       WorldCom, Inc. My business address is 22001 Loudoun County Parkway,  
5       G2-3-582, Ashburn, Virginia 20147. Since September 2000, I have been  
6       responsible for development and implementation of access-related policies in  
7       WorldCom's National Carrier Management organization.

8  
9       **Q.     SUMMARIZE YOUR BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE.**

10      A.       I began my career in telecommunications at the Connecticut Department  
11      of Public Utility Control, where I was employed from 1984-1993 in various  
12      supervisory and managerial positions in telecommunications and utility  
13      regulation, the last four years of which I served as Director of Utility  
14      Regulation and Research. I left the Connecticut DPUC to serve as Executive  
15      Director of the Connecticut General Assembly's 1993-94  
16      Telecommunications Task Force. My responsibility was to facilitate a  
17      negotiated agreement amongst rival parties on exact language for new state  
18      laws opening all of Connecticut's intrastate telecommunications markets to  
19      competition.

20           I subsequently worked as an independent telecommunications regulatory  
21      consultant from 1994 to 1997 for consumer organizations, law firms, other  
22      consulting firms, and new market entrants. In that capacity, I appeared before  
23      numerous state commissions and the FCC on matters pertaining to local

24 market entry policies, quality of service, alternative regulation of ILECs,  
25 consumer issues, competition rules, and numbering issues.

26 From 1997-1999, I was director of research and consulting for  
27 Telecommunications Reports International, Inc., where I authored or edited  
28 numerous books and reports on telecommunications business and regulatory  
29 issues, and conducted research on a contract basis for numerous companies  
30 and state regulatory agencies on telecommunications market and policy issues.  
31 Prior to Joining WorldCom in 2000, I served as a free-lance author and  
32 analyst to the telecommunications trade press, and advised new market  
33 entrants on regulatory and business strategies.

34  
35 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?**

36 A. The purpose of my testimony is to respond to the carrier to carrier  
37 wholesale service quality and remedy rules proposed by the Staff of the  
38 Illinois Commission (Staff) in testimony pre-filed in this proceeding on May  
39 8, 2002. Specifically, I support the Staff's proposal that Level 1 carriers be  
40 required to include in their wholesale service quality plans performance  
41 measures for ordering, provisioning and repair of Special Access services, as  
42 reflected in Section 731.305 of the proposed rule. I discuss the reasons why it  
43 is appropriate that the Commission require Level 1 carriers to implement  
44 performance measures for wholesale special access services and present  
45 specific special access measures, appended to this testimony and identified as  
46 Attachment B, that the Commission should find to be appropriate additions to

any existing performance plans that do not currently contain wholesale special access performance measures. With respect to the rationale for the adoption of such measures, I explain that competing carrier-customers of large incumbent Local Exchange Carriers like SBC-Ameritech and Verizon remain overwhelmingly dependent on SBC-Ameritech's and Verizon's wholesale interstate and intrastate "last-mile" Special Access services. It is the dependence on the Level 1 carriers for the vast majority of Special Access services provided in Illinois that is the foundation for the need for the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC) to monitor the provisioning and maintenance of intrastate and interstate Special Access services on a wholesale basis to affiliated and non-affiliated carrier customers to ensure that competing carrier-customers of SBC-Ameritech and Verizon receive good quality, non-discriminatory performance in order to serve the "last-mile" needs of business and institutional end-user customers in Illinois.

I also provide recommendations as to the definition of "Wholesale Special Access Services," and an appropriate trigger that would require ICC investigation into whether competing facilities-based carriers (termed "Level 4 carriers" pursuant the ICC Staff's testimony) providing wholesale services to other non-ILEC carriers should be converted to Level 2 carriers potentially subject to certain wholesale performance measurements and standards.

**Q. AS A GENERAL MATTER, DO YOU AGREE WITH THE PROVISION OF STAFF'S PROPOSED RULE THAT LEVEL 1 LECS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO INCLUDE IN THEIR CARRIER TO CARRIER WHOLESALE SERVICE QUALITY PLANS PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR ORDERING, PROVISIONING AND REPAIR OF SPECIAL ACCESS SERVICES?**

73  
74 A. Yes. I do recommend changes to the Staff's proposed definition of the  
75 term "Wholesale Special Access," but I support the Staff's inclusion of  
76 Wholesale Special Access services in Section 731.305 as one of the services  
77 for which Level 1 carriers must have performance measures. I believe that  
78 some background regarding special access services is appropriate to put into  
79 context why such measures are warranted. I provide that background before  
80 addressing the definitional issue and the issue of the potential that a Level 4  
81 carrier could be converted to a Level 2 carrier.

82  
83 Q. **FIRST, WILL YOU PLEASE DESCRIBE "SPECIAL ACCESS"?**

84 A. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has established two  
85 basic categories of access services: Special Access services and switched  
86 access services. "Special Access services do not use local switches; instead  
87 they employ dedicated facilities that run directly between the end user and the  
88 IXC's [interexchange carrier] point of presence (POP). Switched access  
89 services, on the other hand, use local exchange switches to route originating  
90 and terminating interstate toll calls."<sup>1</sup> Special Access services, which are  
91 functionally equivalent to certain unbundled network elements (UNEs), are  
92 offered at a number of connection speeds, from analog voice-grade services to  
93 digital services – DS0, DS1, DS3, as well as up to very large capacity SONET  
94 services. I have attached a diagram (Attachment A) on which it can be seen

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<sup>1</sup> *Access Charge Reform*, Fifth Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 96-262, 14 FCC Rcd 14221, at para. 8 and n. 9 (1999) (*Pricing Flexibility Order*), *aff'd sub nom. WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC*, 238 F.3d 449 (D.C.Cir.2001).

95 how Special Access is equivalent to UNE loops and transport, as well as  
96 showing potential facilities that competing carrier customers must order from  
97 ILECS' intrastate and interstate Special Access tariffs to provide "last-mile"  
98 services to end-user customers.

99 It should be noted, however, that the FCC's definition does not capture all  
100 the means by which Special Access is used or provided. For example, Special  
101 Access is also used to connect end users to competitive Local Exchange  
102 Carrier (LEC) collocation facilities.

103 **Q. EXPLAIN THE USE OF INTRASTATE SPECIAL ACCESS AND**  
104 **UNBUNDLED NETWORK ELEMENTS VERSUS INTERSTATE**  
105 **SPECIAL ACCESS.**  
106

107 Intrastate Special Access operates in the same manner as interstate Special  
108 Access. However, intrastate Special Access is predominantly used to provide  
109 local or intraLATA private line-type service to carrier-customers and end  
110 users. Use of Wholesale Intrastate Special Access is limited because the  
111 FCC's "mixed use" rule<sup>2</sup> requires that any circuits carrying 10% or more  
112 interstate traffic must be purchased out of an incumbent LEC's interstate  
113 access tariff. Where possible, competing carriers will attempt to take  
114 advantage of functionally equivalent loop and transport UNEs, which are  
115 priced based on TELRIC or some other forward-looking cost method, unlike  
116 inter- or intrastate Special Access, which are not. However, as discussed  
117 below, there are regulatory and practical limitations to the ordering of UNEs.  
118

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<sup>2</sup> 47 C.F.R. 36.154

119 **Q. WHAT FACTORS REQUIRE OR “STEER” CARRIERS TO ORDER**  
120 **SPECIAL ACCESS?**  
121

122 A. First, the ability of competing carrier-customers to use a combination of  
123 loop and transport UNEs (referred to as “enhanced extended links” or EELs) to  
124 connect customers to their own or other carriers’ long distance networks is  
125 circumscribed by another set of FCC rules. Under the FCC’s “interim” EELs  
126 rules, the conversion of Special Access circuits to EELs is not allowed unless  
127 the EEL for a particular customer will carry a “significant amount of local  
128 exchange service” [voice] for that customer.<sup>3</sup> The FCC’s local usage  
129 requirements are very restrictive: For example, competing carriers seeking to  
130 serve customers with bundled local, long distance and data services, cannot  
131 convert Special Access to EELs in most situations. It is my understanding that  
132 while the FCC’s local use restrictions on EELs have been challenged with  
133 respect to new EELs and the conversion of Special Access circuits to EELs in  
134 Illinois, the Commission has determined that EELs, whether new or existing,  
135 shall on an interim basis be subject to the FCC’s local use restrictions.<sup>4</sup>

136 Second, ILECs often refuse to allow competing carriers to order “new”  
137 EELs if the UNE elements have not previously been combined. It is my  
138 understanding that Ameritech’s position is that the local use test restriction is  
139 applicable to new EELs – a position the Commission has sided with at least on

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<sup>3</sup> *In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, CC Docket No. 96-98, Supplemental Order Clarification, rel. June 2, 2000 (FCC 00-183).

<sup>4</sup> *Investigation into the Compliance of Illinois Bell Telephone Company with the order in Docket 96-0486/96-0569 (Consol.) regarding the filing of tariffs and the accompanying cost studies for interconnection, unbundled network elements and local transport and termination*, Docket 98-0396, Order on Reopening, April 30, 2002 (“TELRIC Compliance Order on Reopening”), p. 24.



an interim basis – and such a restriction makes the availability of EELs extremely limited if non-existent.

Third, incumbent LECs have been known to engage in anti-competitive tactics, such as claiming no capacity exists to provision a loop or transport circuit as a UNE, but then having facilities available when the carrier-customer orders the same circuit under the incumbent's more expensive interstate special access tariff. For example, the Michigan Court of Appeals recently upheld a \$3.75 million fine imposed by the Michigan Public Service Commission against Ameritech for refusing to provide unbundled local transport to a WorldCom subsidiary. Ameritech claimed it lacked facilities necessary to fulfill WorldCom's orders, and that there was no requirement under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to add facilities. The evidence showed that while Ameritech refused to install additional equipment to fulfill WorldCom's orders, it readily did so to serve its own customers or to fill WorldCom's orders for higher cost Special Access service.<sup>5</sup>

Fourth, there are separate ordering systems and processes in place for carrier-customers to order incumbent LEC facilities: The older, more well-established Access Service Request (ASR) system is much easier for competing carrier-customers like WorldCom to use than the newer, separate, less well-developed Local Service Request (LSR) system for the ordering of

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<sup>5</sup> *Michigan Bell Telephone Company, d/b/a Ameritech Michigan, v. Michigan Public Service Commission, and WorldCom Technologies, Inc.*, 2002 Mich. App. LEXIS 74 (Mich. Ct. App., January 22, 2002) (unpublished).

160 UNEs. As a result, CLECs have been steered to order Special Access via  
161 ASRs because efficient LSR ordering processes are not available.

162 Moreover, SBC-Ameritech, Verizon and other large ILECs have  
163 company-specific account teams to facilitate the sale of their Special Access  
164 services, whereas in order to obtain these same last-mile links as UNEs,  
165 competing carrier customers must confront several obstacles in addition to the  
166 LSR ordering system, e.g., protracted negotiations, arbitrations, lawsuits.

167  
168 **Q. ARE SBC-AMERITECH, VERIZON AND OTHER INCUMBENT LECs**  
169 **STILL THE DOMINANT PROVIDERS OF "LAST-MILE"**  
170 **FACILITIES LIKE SPECIAL ACCESS?**

171  
172 **A.** --Yes, clearly incumbent LECs like SBC-Ameritech and Verizon are still  
173 dominant in the provision of all last-mile facilities, whether a competing  
174 carrier must order the large ILECs' facilities as UNEs, or EELs, or intrastate  
175 Special Access, or -- most often -- as interstate Special Access.

176 Competitive LECs, IXC's, and wireless carriers are dependent on the  
177 ubiquitous "last mile" facilities of incumbent LECs like SBC-Ameritech and  
178 Verizon to compete for larger-volume business and government customers, or  
179 to connect cell sites. CLECs and IXCs compete both against each other and  
180 against Verizon to serve higher-volume customers in Illinois. While large  
181 carriers like WorldCom have built some facilities, it simply has not been  
182 economically efficient for any competitor to duplicate incumbent LEC  
183 networks. And, given the current state of the economy in general and the  
184 telecommunications sector in particular, capital funding has either become

185 scarce or so costly that the ability of companies to continue to build out their  
186 networks to compete with incumbent LECs is seriously constrained. Even  
187 larger companies like WorldCom have been forced to reduce capital  
188 expenditures and, therefore, construction of new facilities.

189 In addition, it is often difficult for competitors to access multi-tenant  
190 buildings to put in facilities to serve tenants, where incumbent LECs already  
191 have such access. Competitors are often subject to barriers to entry, additional  
192 costs and time necessary to serve some buildings, making it more likely that a  
193 competitor will resort to ubiquitous facilities of the incumbent LECs to serve a  
194 customer.

195 WorldCom looks first to its own facilities to serve a customer. If no "on-  
196 net" facilities are available, then an attempt is made to find another carrier with  
197 available facilities. The first choice is another competitive access provider  
198 (CAP) or CLEC, simply because CAP/CLEC services are often priced lower  
199 than incumbent LECs' Special Access services, and service provided by other  
200 CAPs/CLECs is usually better overall than the services competing carriers  
201 receive from the large ILECs. If there are no other competing providers  
202 available, then service must be ordered from the incumbent LECs, whose  
203 facilities are the most ubiquitous. In fact, WorldCom must depend on  
204 incumbent LECs to meet 90% of its "off-net" facilities needs. Despite a  
205 company policy favoring aggressive use of CAPs and other CLECs, in reality  
206 only about 10% of WorldCom's "off-net" requirements are met by other CAPs  
207 or CLECs.

208 **Q. IS GOOD QUALITY, NON-DISCRIMINATORY PROVISIONING OF**  
209 **SPECIAL ACCESS IMPORTANT TO COMPETITION AND**  
210 **ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE STATE OF ILLINOIS?**

211  
212 **A.** Yes. As the New York Public Service Commission stated:

213 Because Verizon's facilities are used by carriers as they are entering  
214 the market, including the local market, on a facilities basis, Verizon's  
215 Special Services offerings are crucial for the development of  
216 facilities-based competition in the local market, and for the New York  
217 economy.<sup>6</sup>

218  
219 Even in New York, arguably the most competitive market in the U.S., the  
220 New York Public Service Commission found that Verizon is overwhelmingly  
221 dominant in the provision of "Special Services." The NYPSC upheld this  
222 finding on reconsideration after gathering data from all carriers operating in  
223 New York, with the results showing that "Verizon serves over 79.5% of the  
224 statewide market ..." <sup>7</sup> I believe that a similar analysis conducted in Illinois  
225 would show that SBC-Ameritech and Verizon serve the largest percentage of  
226 the statewide market. As such, SBC-Ameritech's and Verizon's Special  
227 Access facilities represent a key factor in the development of competition to  
228 meet the critical telecommunications needs of business and government  
229 customers in Illinois, and are essential to the state's economy.

230

231 **Q. WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF LARGE ILECS' DOMINANCE IN**  
232 **SPECIAL ACCESS ON COMPETITORS?**

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<sup>6</sup> New York Public Service Commission, Case 00-C-2051 - *Proceeding to Investigate Methods to Improve and Maintain High Quality Special Services Performance by Verizon New York Inc.*, Opinion And Order Modifying Special Services Guidelines For Verizon New York Inc., Conforming Tariff, And Requiring Additional Performance Reporting, June 15, 2001, at p. 10.

<sup>7</sup> New York Public Service Commission, Case 00-C-2051 - *Proceeding to Investigate Methods to Improve and Maintain High Quality Special Services Performance by Verizon New York Inc.*, Order Denying Petitions For Rehearing And Clarifying Applicability Of Special Services Guidelines, December 20, 2001, at p. 10.

233  
234 A. As discussed above, competitive LECs and IXC's must rely on large  
235 ILEC's Special Access service, particularly SBC-Ameritech's and Verizon's  
236 interstate special access service to compete effectively for higher-volume  
237 customers in Illinois.. At the same time, SBC-Ameritech and Verizon can  
238 provide equivalent services directly to end users. A key factor required to  
239 compete effectively with SBC-Ameritech, Verizon, and other competing  
240 carriers is the ability to provide "last-mile" circuits in a timely manner. The  
241 poor level of on-time performance provided by large ILECs to competitor-  
242 customers like WorldCom is an example of the large ILECs' ability to  
243 leverage their market dominance in an anti-competitive manner.

244

245 **Q. WHAT EFFECT DOES A GRANT OF SECTION 271 APPROVAL HAVE**  
246 **ON SBC-AMERITECH'S SPECIAL ACCESS DOMINANCE?**

247

248 A. SBC-Ameritech and other ILECs have always had the ability to  
249 discriminate against competitor-customers in favor of their own retail customers.  
250 However, that incentive increases once the FCC grants to a Bell Operating  
251 Company so-called Section 271 authority to provide in-region interLATA  
252 services. This has been demonstrated by the degradation of SBC-Southwestern  
253 Bell's Special Services to competitors in the wake of its Section 271 approval.  
254 The Texas PUC became the first state commission to require a BOC (SBC) to add  
255 the measurement of interstate Special Access when used in lieu of UNEs to its  
256 local Performance Plan after reviewing evidence indicating SBC's Special Access  
257 performance in Texas declined after receiving 271 approval. The Colorado and

Washington commissions recently confirmed their intent to condition any support for Qwest's 271 application on a Performance Plan that includes measurement of interstate Special Access when ordered in lieu of UNEs. Other states which have imposed or adopted some form of wholesale special access performance reporting on large ILECs include: Minnesota, Tennessee, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Maine.

**Q. WHAT ACTIONS DO YOU RECOMMEND THE ICC TAKE TO ENSURE THAT SBC-AMERITECH AND VERIZON DELIVER GOOD PERFORMANCE IN THE PROVISION OF WHOLESALE SPECIAL ACCESS SERVICES TO COMPETING CARRIER CUSTOMERS?**

**A.** I recommend the ICC join the increasing number of states which are recognizing the critical importance of the Special Access services provided by incumbent LECs like SBC-Ameritech and Verizon to the economy and competition in their states, and require performance measurements and standards to measure SBC-Ameritech's and Verizon's performance in the provision of wholesale Special Access services to their affiliates, and non-affiliated carrier-customers.

**Q. HOW DO YOU RECOMMEND THE COMMISSION MONITOR SBC-AMERITECH'S AND VERIZON'S SPECIAL ACCESS PERFORMANCE?**

**A.** The ICC should act quickly to require SBC-Ameritech and Verizon to report wholesale special access performance based on the set of eleven core metrics developed by a national coalition of CLECs and IXC's, including the two principal competitive industry associations, CompTel and ALTS, as well as a leading association of large business users known as eTUG-- the e-

commerce and Telecommunications Users Group. These metrics properly measure, for the first time ever, the most important performance-related components of the incumbent LECs' Special Access services. This "Joint Competitive Industry Group" (JCIG) proposal was submitted by the aforementioned coalition to the FCC on January 22, 2002 as part of the competitors' response to the FCC's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), and is included here as Attachment B. Specifically, I recommend that the Commission find in its order in this proceeding that these specific Special Access measurements would be acceptable additions to the preexisting plans of SBC-Ameritech and Verizon to bring them into compliance with the Commission's rule in general and Section 731.305 in particular.

Q. **WHAT EFFECT DOES THE FCC'S NOTICE ON ILEC SPECIAL ACCESS PERFORMANCE HAVE ON THE DEPARTMENT'S FCC'S This** ✓  
**PROCEEDING?**

A. The FCC's recently issued NPRM does not prevent or preclude the ICC's SBC Ameritech's and ability to monitor Verizon's wholesale interstate Special Access performance. ✓  
First, there is no timeline for the FCC to act, nor is there any guarantee that the FCC will ultimately adopt effective performance measurements and standards for ILECs' Special Access services. Second, and more important, the FCC has explicitly asked for comments on the extent to which state commissions could play a role regarding special access services, noting that under its "mixed use" rule, special access services taken under federal tariff may carry intrastate

311 traffic (up to 90% of the traffic traversing a circuit purchased from an  
312 incumbent LEC's interstate tariff can be intrastate).<sup>8</sup>

313 Based on the findings made in other states like New York, Minnesota,  
314 Washington, Colorado, and Texas to date, there is no impediment to a state's  
315 ability to require performance *reporting* on circuits provisioned out of an  
316 interstate tariff. Special Access circuits, which are functionally equivalent to  
317 UNEs, are purchased from SBC-Ameritech's and Verizon's facilities that are  
318 physically located in Illinois to serve customers in Illinois. Required reporting  
319 by SBC-Ameritech and Verizon on their provision of wholesale interstate and  
320 intrastate Special Access services is in the public interest because such  
321 reporting can provide a complete picture of competing carriers' ability to  
322 competitively service Illinois customers' "last-mile" needs.

323  
324 **Q. HAVE YOU REVIEWED THE ICC STAFF TESTIMONY SUBMITTED**  
325 **IN THIS PROCEEDING REGARDING RECOMMENDATION ON**  
326 **THE ISSUES OF THE APPLICATION OF WHOLESALE SERVICE**  
327 **MEASUREMENTS AND STANDARDS TO CARRIERS OPERATING**  
328 **IN ILLINOIS, AND SPECIAL ACCESS IN PARTICULAR?**

329  
330 A. Yes.

331 **Q. PLEASE COMMENT ON THE ICC STAFF'S RECOMMENDATION**  
332 **FOR THE APPLICATION OF WHOLESALE SERVICE**  
333 **MEASUREMENTS AND STANDARDS TO CARRIERS OPERATING**  
334 **IN ILLINOIS.**

335  
336 A. I concur with the ICC Staff's recommendation that the ICC rules should  
337 specify four "Levels" of carriers for the purpose of determining the appropriate

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<sup>8</sup> *In the Matter of Performance Measurements and Standards for Interstate Special Access Services*,  
CC Docket No. 01-321, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, rel. November 19, 2001, at para. 11.



amount and type of wholesale carrier-to-carrier performance reporting.<sup>9</sup>

However, I recommend that the ICC adopt a specific “trigger” before the ICC would review a petition to investigate whether a Level 4 carrier should be required to establish a wholesale performance plan and be converted to a Level 2 carrier.

As Mr. McClerren points out, it would be “illogical and unreasonable to develop a rule that treated all carriers the same.”<sup>10</sup> In the proposed rules in Attachment 1.1 to Mr. McClerren’s testimony, Section 731.805 a) would potentially apply Level 2 carrier wholesale service reporting requirements to any Level 4 carrier that “receives a bona fide request for wholesale services and either agrees to provide such services or is obligated to provide such services under the PUA or the Telecommunications Act...” I believe that this provision is vague and unnecessary.

**Q. WHAT DO YOU RECOMMEND AS A TRIGGER FOR COMMISSION REVIEW OF WHETHER A LEVEL 4 CARRIER SHOULD BE RECLASSIFIED AS A LEVEL 2 CARRIER?**

**A.** I recommend that the Commission modify Staff’s proposal so that a petition for reclassification of a Level 4 carrier to a Level 2 carrier would be considered only if a Level 4 carrier’s exemption from the requirements of Section 251(c) of the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TA96) is terminated pursuant to Section 251(h)(2) of TA96. To accomplish this, I recommend that Staff’s proposed Section 731.805 be deleted and replaced with the following:

---

<sup>9</sup> Direct Testimony of Samuel S. McClerren, May 8, 2002; Direct Testimony of Melanie K. Patrick, Ph.D., May 8, 2002.

Section 731.805      Application of Level 2 Requirements to Level 4  
Carriers and Conversion to Level 2

A carrier whose exemption from Section 251(c) of the Telecommunications Act is terminated pursuant to Section 251(h)(2) of the Telecommunications Act may be required to comply with some or all of the Level 2 requirements established in Subpart F of this Part only after the Commission considers and rules for each such carrier, after notice and hearing, upon the following items:

- a) The technical feasibility of compliance with each Subpart F requirement;
- b) The economic feasibility of compliance with each Subpart F requirement;
- c) The expected demand for wholesale services covered under Subpart F;
- d) Whether the benefits accrued to competing carriers justify the costs incurred by carrier necessary to comply each Subpart F requirement;
- e) With which Subpart F requirements that carrier must comply and by what time period; and
- f) Whether the carrier needs to comply with Subpart F if the carrier enters into an agreement with a competing carrier whereby the competing carrier agrees to accept different wholesale service quality standards than those contained in Subpart F.

**Q.      WHY DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THIS TRIGGER IS PREFERRABLE TO THE TRIGGER CONTAINED IN STAFF'S PROPOSED RULE?**

**A.**      I believe that a trigger based on Section 251(c) obligations is logical and efficient. It is the affirmative obligation to provide wholesale services designed to open the local market to vibrant and irreversible competition that flows from Section 251(c) of TA 96. Level 2 carriers have wholesale obligations today under Section 251(c) of the TA96 for the services the

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<sup>10</sup> McClerren Direct Testimony, page 15.

addressed in Staff's proposed rules. Therefore, Level 2 carriers should be prepared to offer the services addressed by Staff's proposed rule. In addition, it is my understanding that some Level 2 ILECs (Citizens Telecommunications of Illinois, Inc. and Gallatin River Telephone Company) have interconnection agreements for the services covered by subpart F of Staff's proposed rule, which presumably means those carriers have done some forecasting to prepare themselves for fluctuations in CLEC demand for the services in question. For these reasons, it is reasonable to assume that Level 2 incumbent LECs have or should have systems in place and be prepared for CLEC orders for the services covered in subpart F of Staff's proposed rule. The same cannot be said of CLECs. However, if Section 251(c) obligations are imposed on a particular CLEC at some point in the future, at that time the Commission can determine whether applying measures applicable to Level 2 carriers, either in whole or in part, would make sense based on the criteria set forth above. I believe this process is logical, and provides more clarity with respect to the exemption and reclassification process. For all of these reasons, I believe that the Section 251(c) trigger is preferable to the trigger set forth in Staff's proposed Section 731.805.

**Q. DO YOU CONCUR WITH THE PROPOSED DEFINITION OF "WHOLESALE SPECIAL ACCESS" SPECIFIED IN THE DIRECT TESTIMONY OF RUSSELL W. MURRAY?**

A. Yes, in general, but I believe the "Wholesale Special Access" definition as written is too restrictive. Mr. Murray has defined it to mean:

428 A Wholesale Service utilizing a dedicated non-switched transmission path  
429 used for carrier-to-carrier services from the customer's NID (Network  
430 Interface Device) or POI (Point of Interface) to the carrier's POI (Point of  
431 Interface). A non-switched transmission path may include, but is not  
432 limited to, DS1, DS3, and OCN facilities as well as links for SS7  
433 signaling, database queries, and SONET ring access.  
434

435 I believe the following definition is more inclusive of the actual  
436 ~~potential~~ <sup>9</sup> Special Access service arrangements and circuit types that are available  
437 ✓  
438 from ILECs on a wholesale basis:  
439  
440

441 "Wholesale Special Access" means a Wholesale Service that provides a  
442 non-switched transmission path between two or more points, either  
443 directly, or through a central office, where bridging or multiplexing  
444 functions are performed, not utilizing ILEC end office switches. Special  
445 access services may include dedicated and shared facilities configured to  
446 support analog/voice grade service, metallic and/or telegraph service,  
447 audio, video, digital data service (DDS), digital transport and high  
448 capacity service (DS1, DS3 and OCn), collocation transport, links for SS7  
449 signaling and database queries, SONET ring access, and broadband  
450 services.  
451

452 Q. OTHER THAN THE AFOREMENTIONED CONCERNS AND  
453 RECOMMENDED CHANGES, DOES WORLDCOM SUPPORT  
454 STAFF'S PROPOSED RULE?  
455

456 A. Yes.  
457

458  
459 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?  
460

461 A. Yes, it does.





WorldCom Ex. 1.0  
Furbish Direct  
Docket No. 01-0539  
June 11, 2002

**Attachment A**













WorldCom Ex. 1.0  
Furbish Direct  
Docket No. 01-0539  
June 11, 2002

**Attachment B**



# **Joint Competitive Industry Group Proposal**

## **ILEC PERFORMANCE** **MEASUREMENTS & STANDARDS**

**in the**  
**Ordering, Provisioning,**  
**and**  
**Maintenance & Repair**  
**of**

## **SPECIAL ACCESS SERVICE**

**Version 1.1**

Issued: January 18, 2002

(submitted to the FCC on 01/22/02 in CC Docket No. 01-321 – by the Joint Competitive Industry Group)

# ILEC Performance Measurements and Standards

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# ILEC Performance Measurements and Standards

## Reporting Dimensions

CLEC or IXC Carrier specific total, with the following reporting dimensions for all measurements.

- Special Access disaggregated by bandwidth  
Sub Totaled by State  
Totaled by ILEC

Comparison reports are required for:

- CLEC/ IXC Carrier Aggregate
- ILEC Affiliates Aggregate

**Special Access** is any exchange access service that provides a transmission path between two or more points, either directly, or through a central office, where bridging or multiplexing functions are performed, not utilizing ILEC end office switches.

Special access services include dedicated and shared facilities configured to support analog/voice grade service, metallic and/or telegraph service, audio, video, digital data service (DDS), digital transport and high capacity service (DS1, DS3 and OCn), collocation transport, links for SS7 signaling and database queries, SONET access including OC-192 based dedicated SONET ring access, and broadband services.

**Exclusions:** Transmission path requests pursuant to an Interconnection Agreement for Unbundled Network Elements are excluded from these Performance Measures.

**Reporting Period:** The reporting period is the calendar month, unless otherwise noted, with all averages or percentages displayed to one decimal point.

# ILEC Performance Measurements and Standards

## ORDERING

### Measurement: JIP-SA-1 FOC Receipt

#### Description

The Firm Order Confirmation (FOC) is the ILEC response to an Access Service Request (ASR), whether an initial or supplement ASR, that provides the CLEC or IXC Carrier with the specific Due Date on which the requested circuit or circuits will be installed. The expectation is that the ILEC will conduct a minimum of an electronic facilities check to ensure due dates delivered in FOCs can be relied upon. The performance standard for FOCs received within the standard interval is expressed as a percentage of the total FOCs received during the reporting period. A diagnostic distribution is required along with a count of ASRs withdrawn at the ILEC's request due to a lack of ILEC facilities or otherwise.

#### Calculation Methodology

Percent Meeting Performance Standard:

$$\frac{[\text{Count FOCs received where (FOC Receipt Date - ASR Sent Date)} \leq \text{Performance Standard}]}{\text{Total FOCs received during reporting period}} \times 100$$

FOC Receipt - Distribution:

(FOC Receipt Date - ASR Sent Date), for each FOC received during reporting period, distributed by:  
0 day, 1 day, 2 days, through 10 days and > 10 days

ASRs Withdrawn at ILEC Request due to a lack of ILEC Facilities or Otherwise

Count of ASRs, which have not yet received a FOC, Withdrawn at ILEC Request, during the current reporting period, due to a lack of ILEC facilities or otherwise

#### Business Rules

1. Counts are based on each instance of a FOC received from the ILEC. If one or more Supplement ASRs are issued to correct or change a request, each corresponding FOC, which is received during the reporting period, is counted and measured.
2. Days shown are business days, Monday to Friday, excluding National Holidays. Activity starting on a weekend, or holiday, will reflect a start date of the next business day, and activity ending on a weekend, or holiday, will be calculated with an end date of the last previous business day.
3. Projects are included. Determination of what is identified as a project varies by ILEC and should not alter the need to ensure that service is provided within expected intervals.

#### Exclusions

- Unsolicited FOCs
- Disconnect ASRs
- Cancelled ASRs
- Record ASRs

#### Levels of Disaggregation

- DS0
- DS1
- DS3
- OCn

#### Performance Standard

Percent FOCs Received within Standard

- DS0 => 98.0% within 2 business days
- DS1 => 98.0% within 2 business days
- DS3 => 98.0% within 5 business days
- OCn - ICB (Individual Case Basis)

FOC Receipt Distribution

- Diagnostic

ASRs Withdrawn at ILEC Request Due to a Lack of ILEC Facilities or Otherwise - Diagnostic

# ILEC Performance Measurements and Standards

## ORDERING

### Measurement: JIP-SA-2 FOC Receipt Past Due

#### Description

The FOC Receipt Past Due measure tracks all ASR requests that have not received an FOC from the ILEC within the expected FOC receipt interval, as of the last day of the reporting period and do not have an open, or outstanding, Query/Reject. This measure gauges the magnitude of late FOCs and is essential to ensure that FOCs are being received in a timely manner from the ILECs. A distribution of these late FOCs, along with a report of those late FOCs that do have an open Query/Reject, is required for diagnostic purposes.

#### Calculation Methodology

Percent FOC Receipt Past Due - Without Open Query/Reject:

Sum of ASRs without a FOC Received, and a Query/Reject is not open, where (End of Reporting Period – ASR Sent Date > Expected FOC Receipt Interval) / Total number of ASRs sent during reporting period x 100

FOC Receipt Past Due - Without Open Query/Reject - Distribution:

[(End of Reporting Period – ASR Sent date) – (Expected FOC Receipt Interval)] for ASRs without a FOC received and a Query/Reject is not open with the CLEC or IXC Carrier, distributed by;  
1-5 Days, 6-10 Days, 11-20 Days, 21- 30 Days, 31-40 Days, and > 40 Days

Percent FOC Receipt Past Due - With Open Query/Reject:

Sum of ASRs without a FOC Received, and a Query/Reject is open, where (End of Reporting Period – ASR Sent Date > Expected FOC Receipt Interval) / Total number of ASRs sent during reporting period x 100

#### Business Rules

1. All counts are based on the latest ASR request sent to the ILEC. Where one or more subsequent ASRs have been sent, only the latest ASR would be recorded as Past Due if no FOC had yet been returned.
2. The Expected FOC Receipt Interval, used in the calculations, will be the interval identified in the Performance Standards for the FOC Receipt measure.
3. Days shown are business days, Monday to Friday, excluding National Holidays. Activity starting on a weekend, or holiday, will reflect a start date of the next business day, and activity ending on a weekend, or holiday, will be calculated with an end date of the last previous business day.
4. Projects are included. Determination of what is identified as a project varies by ILEC and should not alter the need to ensure that service is provided within expected intervals.

#### Exclusions

- Unsolicited FOCs
- Disconnect ASRs
- Cancelled ASRs
- Record ASRs

#### Levels of Disaggregation

- DS0
- DS1
- DS3
- OCn

#### Performance Standard

Percent FOC Receipt Past Due - Without Open Query/Reject

< 2.0 % FOC Receipt Past Due

FOC Receipt Past Due – Without Open Query/Reject - Distribution

- Diagnostic

Percent FOC Receipt Past Due - With Open Query/Reject

- Diagnostic

# ILEC Performance Measurements and Standards

## ORDERING

### Measurement: JIP-SA-3 Offered Versus Requested Due Date

#### Description

The Offered Versus Requested Due Date measure reflects the degree to which the ILEC is committing to install service on the CLEC or IXC Carrier Requested Due Date (CRDD), when a Due Date Request is equal to or greater than the ILEC stated interval. A distribution of the delta, the difference between the CRDD and the Offered Date, for these FOCs is required for diagnostic purposes.

#### Calculation Methodology

Percent Offered with CLEC or IXC Carrier Requested Due Date:

$$\frac{[\text{Count of ASRs where (FOC Due Date = CRDD)}]}{[\text{Total number of ASRs where (CRDD - ASR Sent Date) = > ILEC Stated Interval}]} \times 100$$

Offered versus Requested Interval Delta - Distribution:

$$[(\text{Offered Due Date} - \text{CRDD}) \text{ where } (\text{CRDD} - \text{ASR Sent Date}) = > \text{ILEC Stated Interval}] \text{ for each FOC received during the reporting period, distributed by; } 0 \text{ Days, } 1-5 \text{ Days, } 6-10 \text{ Days, } 11-20 \text{ Days, } 21-30 \text{ Days, } 31-40 \text{ Days, and } > 40 \text{ Days}$$

#### Business Rules

1. Counts are based on each instance of a FOC received from the ILEC. If one or more Supplement ASRs are issued to correct or change a request, each corresponding FOC, which is received during the reporting period, is counted and measured.
2. Days shown are business days, Monday to Friday, excluding National Holidays. Activity starting on a weekend, or holiday, will reflect a start date of the next business day, and activity ending on a weekend, or holiday, will be calculated with an end date of the last previous business day.
3. Projects are included. Determination of what is identified as a project varies by ILEC and should not alter the need to ensure that service is provided within expected intervals.

#### Exclusions

- Unsolicited FOCs
- Disconnect ASRs
- Cancelled ASRs
- Record ASRs

#### Levels of Disaggregation

- DS0
- DS1
- DS3
- OCn

#### Performance Standard

Percent Offered with CRDD (where CRDD = > ILEC Stated Interval) = 100%

Offered versus Requested Interval Delta - Distribution - Diagnostic

ILEC Stated Intervals: To be determined by ILEC

# ILEC Performance Measurements and Standards

## PROVISIONING

### Measurement: JIP-SA-4 On Time Performance To FOC Due Date

#### Description

On Time Performance To FOC Due Date measures the percentage of circuits that are completed on the FOC Due Date, as recorded from the FOC received in response to the last ASR sent. Customer Not Ready (CNR) situations may result in an installation delay. The On Time Performance To FOC Due Date is calculated both with CNR consideration, i.e. measuring the percentage of time the service is installed on the FOC due date while counting CNR coded orders as an appointment met, and without CNR consideration.

#### Calculation Methodology

Percent On Time Performance to FOC Due Date – With CNR Consideration:

$$\frac{[(\text{Count of Circuits Completed on or before ILEC Committed Due Date} + \text{Count of Circuits Completed after FOC Due Date with a verifiable CNR code}) / (\text{Count of Circuits Completed in Reporting Period})] \times 100}{}$$

Percent On Time Performance to FOC Due Date – Without CNR Consideration:

$$\frac{[(\text{Count of Circuits Completed on or before ILEC Committed Due Date}) / (\text{Count of Circuits Completed in Reporting Period})] \times 100}{}$$

Note: The denominator for both calculations is the total count of circuits completed during the reporting period, including all circuits, with and without a CNR code.

#### Business Rules

1. Measures are based on the last ASR sent and the associated FOC Due Date received from the ILEC.
2. Selection is based on circuits completed by the ILEC during the reporting period. An ASR may provision more than one circuit and ILECs may break the ASR into separate internal orders, however, the ASR is not considered completed for measurement purposes until all circuits are completed.
3. The ILEC Completion Date is the date upon which the ILEC completes installation of the circuit, as noted on a completion advice to the CLEC or IXC Carrier.
4. Projects are included. Determination of what is identified as a project varies by ILEC and should not alter the need to ensure that service is provided on the FOC Due Date.
5. A Customer Not Ready (CNR) is defined as a verifiable situation beyond the normal control of the ILEC that prevents the ILEC from completing an order, including the following: CLEC or IXC Carrier is not ready; end user is not ready; connecting company, or CPE (Customer Premises Equipment) supplier, is not ready. The ILEC must ensure that established procedures are followed to notify the CLEC or IXC Carrier of a CNR situation and allow a reasonable period of time for the CLEC or IXC Carrier to correct the situation.

#### Exclusions

- Unsolicited FOCs
- Disconnect ASRs
- Cancelled ASRs
- Record ASRs

#### Levels of Disaggregation

- DS0
- DS1
- DS3
- OCn

#### Performance Standard

Percent On Time to FOC Due Date - With CNR Consideration = > 98.0 % On Time

Percent On Time to FOC Due Date - Without CNR Consideration - Diagnostic

# ILEC Performance Measurements and Standards

## PROVISIONING

### Measurement: JIP-SA-5 Days Late

#### Description

Days Late captures the magnitude of the delay, both in average and distribution, for those circuits not completed on the FOC Due Date, and the delay was not a result of a verifiable CNR situation. A breakdown of delay days caused by a lack of ILEC facilities is required for diagnostic purposes.

#### Calculation Methodology

Average Days Late:

$$\frac{\sum[\text{Circuit Completion Date} - \text{ILEC Committed Due Date (for all Circuits Completed Beyond ILEC Committed Due Date without a CNR code)}]}{(\text{Count of Circuits Completed Beyond ILEC Committed Due Date without a CNR code})}$$

Days Late Distribution:

Circuit Completion Date – ILEC Committed Due Date (for all Circuits Completed Beyond ILEC Committed Due Date without a CNR code) distributed by: 1 day, 2-5 Days, 6-10 Days, 11-20 Days, 21- 30 Days, 31-40 Days, and > 40 Days

Average Days Late Due to a Lack of ILEC Facilities:

$$\frac{\sum[\text{Circuit Completion Date} - \text{ILEC Committed Due Date (for all Circuits Completed Beyond ILEC Committed Due Date without a CNR code and due to a Lack of ILEC Facilities)}]}{(\text{Count of Circuits Completed Beyond ILEC Committed Due Date without a CNR code and due to a Lack of ILEC Facilities})}$$

#### Business Rules

1. Measures are based on the last ASR sent and the associated FOC Due Date received from the ILEC.
2. Selection is based on circuits completed by the ILEC during the reporting period. An ASR may provision more than one circuit and ILECs may break the ASR into separate internal orders, however, the ASR is not considered completed for measurement purposes until all circuits are completed.
3. Days shown are business days, Monday to Friday, excluding National Holidays. Activity starting on a weekend, or holiday, will reflect a start date of the next business day, and activity ending on a weekend, or holiday, will be calculated with an end date of the last previous business day.
4. Projects are included. Determination of what is identified as a project varies by ILEC and should not alter the need to ensure that service is provided on the FOC Due Date.
5. A Customer Not Ready (CNR) is defined as a verifiable situation beyond the normal control of the ILEC that prevents the ILEC from completing an order, including the following: CLEC or IXC Carrier is not ready; end user is not ready; connecting company, or CPE (Customer Premises Equipment) supplier, is not ready. The ILEC must ensure that established procedures are followed to notify the CLEC or IXC Carrier of a CNR situation and allow a reasonable period of time for the CLEC or IXC Carrier to correct the situation

#### Exclusions

- Unsolicited FOCs
- Disconnect ASRs
- Cancelled ASRs
- Record ASRs

#### Levels of Disaggregation

- DS0
- DS1
- DS3
- OCn

#### Performance Standard

Average Days Late < 3.0 Days  
Days Late Distribution - Diagnostic  
Average Days Late Due to a Lack of ILEC Facilities - Diagnostic

# ILEC Performance Measurements and Standards

## PROVISIONING

### Measurement: JIP-SA-6 Average Intervals - Requested/Offered/Installation

#### Description

The intent of this measure is to capture three important aspects of the provisioning process and display them in relation to each other. The Average CLEC or IXC Carrier Requested Interval, the Average ILEC Offered Interval, and the Average Installation Interval, provide a comprehensive view of provisioning, with the ultimate goal of having these three intervals equivalent.

#### Calculation Methodology

Average CLEC or IXC Carrier Requested Interval:

$\text{Sum (CRDD - ASR Sent Date)} / \text{Total Circuits Completed during reporting period}$

Average ILEC Offered Interval:

$\text{Sum (FOC Due Date - ASR Sent Date)} / \text{Total Circuits Completed during reporting period}$

Average Installation Interval:

$\text{Sum (ILEC Completion Date - ASR Sent Date)} / \text{Total Circuits Completed during reporting period}$

#### Business Rules

1. Measures are based on the last ASR sent and the associated FOC Due Date received from the ILEC.
2. Selection is based on circuits completed by the ILEC during the reporting period. An ASR may provision more than one circuit and ILECs may break the ASR into separate internal orders, however, the ASR is not considered completed for measurement purposes until all circuits are completed.
3. Days shown are business days, Monday to Friday, excluding National Holidays. Activity starting on a weekend, or holiday, will reflect a start date of the next business day, and activity ending on a weekend, or holiday, will be calculated with an end date of the last previous business day.
4. Projects are included. Determination of what is identified as a project varies by ILEC and should not alter the need to ensure that service is provided within expected intervals.
5. The Average Installation Interval includes all completions.

#### Exclusions

- Unsolicited FOCs
- Disconnect ASRs
- Cancelled ASRs
- Record ASRs

#### Levels of Disaggregation

- DS0
- DS1
- DS3
- OCn

#### Performance Standard

Average Requested Interval - Diagnostic  
Average Offered Interval - Diagnostic  
Average Installation Interval - Diagnostic

# ILEC Performance Measurements and Standards

## PROVISIONING

### Measurement: JIP-SA-7 Past Due Circuits

#### Description

The Past Due Circuits measure provides a snapshot view of circuits not completed as of the end of the reporting period. The count is taken from those circuits that have received an FOC Due Date but the date has passed. Results are separated into those held for ILEC reasons and those held for CLEC or IXC Carrier reasons (CNRs), with a breakdown, for diagnostic purposes, of Past Due Circuits due to a lack of ILEC facilities. A diagnostic measure, Percent Cancellations After FOC Due Date, is included to show a percent of all cancellations processed during the reporting period where the cancellation took place after the FOC Due Date had passed

#### Calculation Methodology

Percent Past Due Circuits:

$$\left[ \frac{\text{Count of all circuits not completed at the end of the reporting period} > 5 \text{ days beyond the FOC Due Date, grouped separately for Total ILEC Reasons, Lack of ILEC Facility Reasons, and Total CLEC/Carrier Reasons}}{\text{Total uncompleted circuits past FOC Due Date, for all missed reasons, at the end of the reporting period}} \right] \times 100$$

Past Due Circuits Distribution:

Count of all circuits past the FOC Due Date that have not been reported as completed (Calculated as last day of reporting period - FOC Due Date) Distributed by: 1-5 days, 6-10 days, 11-20 days, 21-30 days, 31-40 Days, > 40 days

Percent Cancellations After FOC Due Date:

$$\left[ \frac{\text{Count (All circuits cancelled during reporting period, that were Past Due at the end of the previous reporting period, where (Date Cancelled} > \text{FOC Due Date)}}{\text{Total circuits Past Due at the end of the previous reporting period}} \right] \times 100$$

#### Business Rules

1. Calculation of Past Due Circuits is based on the most recent ASR and associated FOC Due Date.
2. An ASR may provision more than one circuit and ILECs may break the ASR into separate internal orders, however, the ASR is not considered completed for measurement purposes until all segments are completed.
3. Days shown are business days, Monday to Friday, excluding National Holidays. Activity starting on a weekend, or holiday, will reflect a start date of the next business day, and activity ending on a weekend, or holiday, will be calculated with an end date of the last previous business day.
4. Projects are included. Determination of what is or is not identified as a project varies by ILEC and should not alter the need to ensure that service is provided on the FOC Due Date.
5. A Customer Not Ready (CNR) is defined as a verifiable situation beyond the normal control of the ILEC that prevents the ILEC from completing an order, including the following: CLEC or IXC Carrier is not ready; end user is not ready; connecting company, or CPE (Customer Premises Equipment) supplier, is not ready. The ILEC must ensure that established procedures are followed to notify the CLEC or IXC Carrier of a CNR situation and allow a reasonable period of time for the CLEC or IXC Carrier to correct the situation

#### Exclusions

- Unsolicited FOCs
- Disconnect ASRs
- Record ASRs

#### Levels of Disaggregation

- DSO / DS1 / DS3 / OCn

#### Performance Standard

Percent Past Due Circuits - Total ILEC Reasons	< 3.0 % > 5 days beyond FOC Due Date
Percent Past Due Circuits - Due to Lack of ILEC Facilities	- Diagnostic
Percent Past Due Circuits - Total CLEC Reasons	- Diagnostic
Past Due Circuits Distribution	- Diagnostic
Percent Cancellation After FOC Due Date	- Diagnostic



# ILEC Performance Measurements and Standards

## PROVISIONING

### Measurement: JIP-SA-8 New Installation Trouble Report Rate

#### Description

New Installation Trouble Report Rate measures the quality of the installation work by capturing the rate of trouble reports on new circuits within 30 calendar days of the installation.

#### Calculation Methodology

Trouble Report Rate Within 30 Calendar Days of Installation:

$$\frac{\text{[Count (trouble reports within 30 Calendar Days of Installation)]}}{\text{(Total Number of Circuits Installed in the Report Period)}} \times 100$$

#### Business Rules

1. The ILEC Completion Date is the date upon which the ILEC completes installation of the circuit, as noted on a completion advice to the CLEC or IXC Carrier.
2. The calculation for the preceding 30 calendar days is based on the creation date of the trouble ticket.

#### Exclusions

- Trouble tickets that are canceled at the CLEC's or IXC Carrier's request
- CLEC, IXC Carrier, CPE (Customer Premises Equipment), or other customer caused troubles
- ILEC trouble reports associated with administrative service
- Tickets used to track referrals of misdirected calls
- CLEC or IXC Carrier requests for informational tickets

#### Levels of Disaggregation

- DS0
- DS1
- DS3
- OCn

#### Performance Standard

New Installation Trouble Report Rate  $\leq 1.0$  trouble reports per 100 circuits installed

# ILEC Performance Measurements and Standards

## MAINTENANCE & REPAIR

### Measurement: JIP-SA-9 Failure Rate

#### Description

Failure Rate measures the overall quality of the circuits being provided by the ILEC and is calculated by dividing the number of troubles resolved during the reporting period by the total number of "in service" circuits, at the end of the reporting period, and is then annualized by multiplying by 12 months.

#### Calculation Methodology

Failure Rate – Annualized:

$$\{[(\text{Count of Trouble Reports resolved during the Reporting Period}) / (\text{Number of Circuits In Service at the end of the Report Period})] \times 100\} \times 12$$

#### Business Rules

1. A trouble report/ticket is any record (whether paper or electronic) used by the ILEC for the purposes of tracking related action and disposition of a service repair or maintenance situation.
2. A trouble is resolved when the ILEC issues notice to the CLEC or IXC Carrier that the circuit has been restored to normal operating parameters.
3. Where more than one trouble is resolved on a specific circuit during the reporting period, each trouble is counted in the Trouble Report Rate.

#### Exclusions:

- Trouble tickets that are canceled at the CLEC's or IXC Carrier's request
- CLEC, IXC Carrier, CPE (Customer Premises Equipment), or other customer caused troubles
- ILEC trouble reports associated with administrative service
- CLEC or IXC Carrier requests for informational tickets
- Tickets used to track referrals of misdirected calls

#### Levels of Disaggregation

- Below DS3 (DS0 + DS1)
- DS3 and Above (DS3 + OCn)

#### Performance Standard

Failure Rate Annualized	- Below DS3	<= 10.0%
	- DS3 and Above	<= 10.0%

# ILEC Performance Measurements and Standards

## MAINTENANCE & REPAIR

### Measurement: JIP-SA-10 Mean Time to Restore

#### Description

The Mean Time To Restore interval measures the promptness in restoring circuits to normal operating levels when a problem or trouble is referred to the ILEC. Calculation is the elapsed time from the CLEC or IXC Carrier submission of a trouble report to the ILEC to the time the ILEC closes the trouble, less any Customer Hold Time or Delayed Maintenance Time due to valid customer, CLEC, or IXC Carrier caused delays. A breakdown of the percent of troubles outstanding greater than 24 hours, and the Mean Time to Restore of those troubles recorded as Found OK / Test OK, is required for diagnostic purposes.

#### Calculation Methodology

Mean Time To Restore:

$$\Sigma [(Date and Time of Trouble Ticket Resolution Closed to the CLEC or IXC Carrier - Date and Time of Trouble Ticket Referred to the ILEC) - (Customer Hold Times)] / (Count of Trouble Tickets Resolved in Reporting Period)]$$

% Out of Service Greater than 24 hrs:

$$[Count of Troubles where (Date and Time of Trouble Ticket Resolution Closed to the CLEC or IXC Carrier - Date and Time of Trouble Ticket Referred to the ILEC) - (Customer Hold Times) is > 24 hrs / (Count of Trouble Tickets Resolved in Reporting Period)] \times 100$$

Mean Time To Restore – Found OK / Test OK:

$$\Sigma [(Date and Time of Trouble Ticket Resolution Closed to the CLEC or IXC Carrier as Found OK/Test OK - Date and Time of Trouble Ticket Referred to the ILEC) - (Customer Hold Times)] / (Count of Trouble Tickets Resolved in Reporting Period as Found OK/Test OK)]$$

#### Business Rules

1. A trouble report or trouble ticket is any record (whether paper or electronic) used by the ILEC for the purposes of tracking related action and disposition of a service repair or maintenance situation.
2. Elapsed time is measured on a 24-hour, seven-day per-week basis, without consideration of weekends or holidays.
3. Multiple reports in a given period are included, unless the multiple reports for the same customer is categorized as "subsequent" (an additional report on an already open ticket).
4. "Restore" means to return to the normally expected operating parameters for the service regardless of whether or not the service, at the time of trouble ticket creation, was operating in a degraded mode or was completely unusable. A trouble is "resolved" when the ILEC issues notice to the CLEC or IXC Carrier that the customer's service is restored to normal operating parameters.
6. Customer Hold Time or Delayed Maintenance Time resulting from verifiable situations of no access to the end user's premises, or other CLEC or IXC Carrier caused delays, such as holding the ticket open for monitoring, is deducted from the total resolution interval.

#### Exclusions:

- Trouble tickets that are canceled at the CLEC's or IXC Carrier's request
- CLEC, IXC Carrier, CPE (Customer Premises Equipment), or other customer caused troubles
- ILEC trouble reports associated with administrative service
- CLEC or IXC Carrier requests for informational tickets
- Trouble tickets created for tracking and/or monitoring circuits
- Tickets used to track referrals of misdirected calls

#### Levels of Disaggregation

- Below DS3 (DS0 + DS1)
- DS3 and Above (DS3 + OCn)

#### Performance Standard

Mean Time to Restore	- Below DS3	<= 2.0 Hours
	- DS3 and Above	<= 1.0 Hour
% Out of Service > 24 Hrs		- Diagnostic
Mean Time to Restore – Found OK / Test OK		- Diagnostic

# ILEC Performance Measurements and Standards

## MAINTENANCE & REPAIR

### Measurement: JIP-SA-11 Repeat Trouble Report Rate

#### Description

The Repeat Trouble Report Rate measures the percent of maintenance troubles resolved during the current reporting period that had at least one prior trouble ticket any time in the preceding 30 calendar days from the creation date of the current trouble report.

#### Calculation Methodology

Repeat Trouble Report Rate:

$$\frac{[(\text{Count of Current Trouble Reports with a previous trouble, reported on the same circuit, in the preceding 30 calendar days})]}{(\text{Number of Reports in the Report Period})} \times 100$$

#### Business Rules

1. A trouble report or trouble ticket is any record (whether paper or electronic) used by the ILEC for the purposes of tracking related action and disposition of a service repair or maintenance situation.
2. A trouble is resolved when the ILEC issues notice to the CLEC or IXC Carrier that the circuit has been restored to normal operating parameters.
3. If a trouble ticket was closed out previously with the disposition code classifying it as FOK/TOK/CPE/IXC, then the second trouble must be counted as a repeat trouble report if it is resolved to ILEC reasons.
4. The trouble resolution need not be identical between the repeated reports for the incident to be counted as a repeated trouble.

#### Exclusions:

- Trouble tickets that are canceled at the CLEC's or IXC Carrier's request
- CLEC, IXC Carrier, CPE (Customer Premises Equipment), or other customer caused troubles
- ILEC trouble reports associated with administrative service
- Subsequent trouble reports – defined as those cases where a customer called to check on the status of an existing open trouble ticket

#### Levels of Disaggregation

- Below DS3 (DS0 + DS1)
- DS3 and Above (DS3 + OCn)

#### Performance Standards

Repeat Trouble Report Rate

- Below DS3	<= 6.0%
- DS3 and Above	<= 3.0%

# ILEC Performance Measurements and Standards

## GLOSSARY

Term	Definition
<b>Access Service Request (ASR)</b>	A request to an ILEC to order new service, or request a change to existing service, which provides access to the local exchange company's network, under terms specified in the local exchange company's special or switched access tariffs
<b>Business Days</b>	Monday thru Friday excluding holidays
<b>Customer Not Ready (CNR)</b>	A verifiable situation beyond the normal control of the ILEC that prevents the ILEC from completing an order, including the following: CLEC or IXC Carrier is not ready; end user is not ready; connecting company, or CPE (Customer Premises Equipment) supplier, is not ready
<b>Facility Check</b>	A pre-provisioning check performed by the ILEC, in response to an access service request, to determine the availability of facilities and assign the installation date
<b>Firm Order Confirmation (FOC)</b>	The notice returned from the ILEC, in response to an Access Service Request from a CLEC or IXC Carrier that confirms receipt of the request, that a facility has been made, and that a service request has been created with an assigned due date
<b>Unsolicited FOC</b>	An Unsolicited FOC is a supplemental FOC issued by the ILEC to change the due date or for other reasons, although no change to the ASR was requested by the CLEC or IXC Carrier
<b>Project</b>	Service requests that exceed the line size and/or level of complexity that would allow the use of standard ordering and provisioning processes
<b>Query/Reject</b>	An ILEC response to an ASR requesting clarification or correction to one or more fields on the ASR before an FOC can be issued
<b>Repeat Trouble</b>	Trouble that reoccurs on the same telephone number/circuit ID within 30 calendar days
<b>Supplement ASR</b>	A revised ASR that is sent to change due dates or alter the original ASR request. A "Version" indicator related to the original ASR number tracks each Supplement ASR.